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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the relationship between subjective measures of international al-
liance performance and a set of variables, which may act as predictors of success before 
the alliance is formed (pre-alliance formation factors), and a set of variables which 
emerge during the operation of the alliance (post-alliance formation factors). The empiri-
cal study, based on a web-survey, investigates a sample of Danish partner firms engaged 
in 48 equity joint ventures and 70 non-equity joint ventures with international partners. 
The results show a significant relationship between alliance performance and partner 
reputation preceding alliance formation as well as strong relationships between collabora-
tive know-how, trust, and protectiveness and alliance performance during the operation 
of the alliance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International strategic alliances are a rapidly growing organizational form attesting to 
the growing importance of conducting business across institutional and national borders. 
The dramatic growth of international joint ventures between firms is fundamentally re-
shaping the nature of international business. As market complexity is growing, inter-firm 
collaboration has become a crucial component of the pursuit of international competitive 
advantage. Yet such international collaborative arrangements are very complex to man-
age successfully, partly because of the difficulty of matching the goals and aspirations of 
autonomous organizations, headquartered in two or more countries. Often, it seems, the 
good intentions and rational motives behind these alliances are not congruent with the 
strategic direction of either firm on its own, let alone the strategic direction of both in 
unison. Consequently, IJVs are frequently plagued with high degrees of instability and 
poor performance (Parkhe, 1993). 
Research on strategic collaboration between firms has received increasing attention in 
the literature during the last two decades, reflecting the increasing frequency and impor-
tance of strategic alliances in business practice. Two main streams, in terms of focus, in 
this literature can be identified; one stream is mainly concerned with examining the un-
derlying conditions favoring alliance formation (motivation for alliance formation and 
contractual, or structural, structures used in these alliances) (Harrigan, 1985; Contractor 
& Lorange, 1988; Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1991), the other stream is occupied with 
investigating alliance outcomes and the impact of alliances on the partner firms (Kogut, 
1989; Blodgett, 1992; Dussage & Garette, 1995; Doz, 1996). Rarely have the two streams 
been combined in order to investigate the underlying factors that promote (or impede) 
successful outcomes in international strategic alliances (Saxton, 1997)1. This study aims 
at combining elements from these two streams of research in an attempt to gain a more 
complete understanding of the determining factors of international alliance performance. 
The paper is organized as follows: The following section provides a review of the 
relevant literature on determinants of performance in international strategic alliances and 
develops a set of research hypotheses. Data collection and method is discussed in the 
third section. The fourth section presents results and the fifth discusses the findings. The 
final section addresses limitations of the study and offers avenues for future research.    
                                                 
1 For an exception, see Glaister & Buckley, 1999. 
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 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE 
Measures of Alliance Performance 
The debate in the literature on alliance outcome has predominantly been focusing on 
outcome as a result of either (1) conditions surrounding the formation (e.g. Kogut, 1988a; 
Park & Ungson, 1997) or (2) collaborative processes and partner interaction (e.g. Ring & 
Van de Ven, 1994; Larsson et al., 1998). Many of the early empirical studies concerning 
performance in international alliances relied on a variety of financial and objective indi-
cators, such as profitability, growth and cost position (Tomlinson, 1970; Lecraw, 1983), 
survival (Killing, 1983; Geringer, 1990), duration (Harrigan, 1986; Kogut, 1988b), insta-
bility of ownership (Gomes-Casseres, 1987), and re-negotiation of the alliance contract 
(Blodgett, 1992). Other scholars link not only duration and performance, but also include 
the underlying motives behind the alliance formation. For instance, Porter and Fuller 
(1986) implicitly link the time horizon of an alliance to the motives behind its formation: 
‘Coalitions involving access to knowledge or ability are the most likely to dissolve as the  
party gaining access acquires its own internal skills through the coalition. Coalitions designed  
to gain the benefits of scale or learning in performing an activity have a more enduring  
purpose. If they dissolve, they will tend to dissolve into merger or into an arm’s-length  
transaction. The stability of risk-reducing coalitions depends on the sources of risk they seek  
to control. Coalitions hedging against the risk of a single exogenous event will tend to  
dissolve, while coalitions involving an ongoing risk (e.g., exploration risk for oil) will be  
more durable (p. 329).’ 
Similarly, Anderson and Weitz (1989) propose a model in which “perceived continuity of 
relationship” is a dependent variable, determined in part by trust, reputation for fair play 
(i.e. the absence of perceived opportunism), and communication between the parties. Ac-
cording to Anderson and Weitz (1989), a convergence of the latter variables promotes 
long-term relationships, which in turn facilitates the attainment of the alliance motives of 
flexibility, scale economies, efficiency, and low overhead. Although implicitly linking 
motivation for alliance formation to performance outcome, the primary focus of these 
studies is on the relationship between repeated interaction and motives for alliance forma-
tion and duration and survival of the alliance is seen as a prerequisite for success. How-
ever, international strategic alliances may not be intended to fulfill standard financial ob-
jectives such as profit generation, but may instead be formed to fulfill a range of motives, 
such as enhancing parent learning (Kogut, 1988), improving strategic positioning of the 
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parent firms (Contractor and Lorange, 1988), or gaining legitimacy within the larger so-
cial environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Hence, the extent to which an interna-
tional alliance has achieved its aims may not be adequately reflected by financial and ob-
jective measures. In fact, as argued by Geringer and Hebert (1991), despite poor financial 
results, liquidation, or instability, an international alliance may have met or exceeded the 
parents’ objectives and so be considered successful by one or all of the parents. By the 
same token, an international alliance may be viewed as unsuccessful despite good finan-
cial results or continued duration and survival. As suggested by Anderson (1990), per-
haps parents need to recognize that most international alliances should be evaluated more 
subjectively over a longer period of time than is usually the case. By utilizing strictly 
formal, financial measures of performance, managers run the risk of terminating the alli-
ance before it has reached its full potential. This has lead several researchers to turn to 
subjective, perceptual measures of a parent’s satisfaction with alliance performance in an 
effort to provide information regarding the extent to which the alliance has achieved its 
overall objectives (see for example Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1985). 
Hence, in light of this controversy it is hardly surprising that the operationalization of 
international alliance performance has proved difficult, with no consensus on the appro-
priate definition and measure of this concept (Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Parkhe, 1993; 
Glaister & Buckley, 1999).  
   
Determinants of Alliance Performance 
Alliance performance is a complex, systems-level concept that becomes relevant only 
when its component parts are thoroughly understood down to the operational level. Mul-
tiple factors determine the performance outcome of international strategic alliances, rang-
ing from the nature of the industry and institutional environment within which the alli-
ance operates to the quality and commitment of the alliance management. Since inter-
organizational collaboration, especially across national borders, is path-dependent and 
continuously changing over time, it is conceptually important to distinguish between fac-
tors contributing to performance at the outset of an international strategic alliance and 
factors determining the ongoing development of performance in the relationship. Conse-
quently, the following discussion of the determinants of performance in international stra-
tegic alliances is separated into two categories: pre-alliance formation factors and post-
alliance formation factors pertaining to different stages during the relationship develop-
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ment. Pre-alliance formation factors refer to variables pertaining to the time before the 
alliance is formed, in particular prior experience with partner, the reputation of the part-
ner, and the perceived learning potential. Once the alliance is formed and operating, post-
alliance formation factors, such as collaborative know-how, trust, protectiveness, and 
cultural distance are hypothesized to determine the performance of the alliance. While the 
individual importance of most of these variables has long been recognized in the strategic 
alliance literature, their simultaneous effects on international alliance performance have 
thus far been ignored. Figure 1 on the next page shows the conceptual model discussed in 
detail below. 
 
Pre-Alliance Formation Factors  
1. Prior Experience with Partner 
According to transaction cost economics (TCE), in a world without transaction costs 
all activities would be carried out as exchanges between units, and it is due to the failure 
of markets to allow for many exchanges without prohibitively high transaction costs that 
firms come to exist (Williamson, 1985, 1991). In addition to concerns about the emer-
gence of firms as a response to transaction costs, TCE also deals with the choice of or-
ganizational form and how this may vary according to the specific types of exchange ac-
tivities encompassed. Alliances blend elements of the two extremes of market and hierar-
chy. Following this, it seems logical that firms would enter such collaborative arrange-
ments when the transaction costs associated with an exchange are intermediate and not 
high enough to justify vertical integration (Williamson, 1985). Hence, the application of 
TCE to the formation and management of international strategic alliances seems obvious. 
Recently, however, researchers have been critical of TCE’s treatment of each transaction 
between firms as an independent event (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). This assumption is 
particularly inappropriate in situations where firms repeatedly enter into relationships of 
transactions with each other, since as the length of the interaction between partners in-
creases, the economic and informational transactions become increasingly embedded 
within the social relations of the partners, which helps establish 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model
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trust and deter opportunism (Granovetter, 1985). The desire and willingness to expend 
resources in the development of long-term relationships is closely linked to a firm’s prior 
experiences with that partner and the extent to which positive or negative expectancies 
have been fulfilled (Larson, 1992). Experience earned from prior engagement serves as 
evidence to justify subsequent risky steps beyond the accumulated evidence (Das and 
Teng, 1998). That is, faced with a situation in which one can be taken advantage of, a 
natural response is to restrict one’s transactions to those who have shown themselves to 
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be trustworthy. Hence, a benefit of prior affiliation is that it allows the partner firms to 
know each other better thus facilitating a greater understanding of the respective capabili-
ties and resources they are seeking to access and combine (Saxton, 1997). In addition, 
prior relationships indicate a history of repeated interaction, which may lead to relational 
advantages and stability. Thus, from a game-theoretic perspective, giving incumbents an 
advantage in the next round serves as a signal to the partner that the focal firm is playing 
a long-run “repeated game” (Fundenberg & Levine, 1998).  
Moreover, successful previous cooperation between the partners leads to the devel-
opment of skills and routines that are specific to the relationship. These relationship-
specific assets include knowledge about the strategy, structure, and operation of the part-
ner organization as well as familiarity with its executives and managers. In international 
strategic alliances, where the likelihood of failure due to dissimilarities is high, this 
source of information about cultural (both organizational and national) characteristics of 
the partner firm can save valuable time and agony in the early states of alliance forma-
tion. In addition, it seems easier to strengthen personal ties that are already in place than 
to start anew. Hence, prior experience with a partner may increase the likelihood of pre-
dicting accurately expected behavior of the partner and thus reduce the potential for con-
flict. Consequently, one would expect prior experience with a partner to be positively re-
lated to international alliance performance: 
  
Hypothesis 1: Prior experience with a partner is positively related to alliance per-
formance. 
2. Partner Reputation 
Reputation refers, in this study, to the knowledge held by individuals about the poten-
tial partner in terms of this partner’s behavior in prior network relationships in addition to 
more traditional attributes of reputation, such as innovativeness, quality of management, 
employee talent, financial soundness, use of corporate assets, social responsibility, qual-
ity of product/services etc. Hence, the concept of reputation is closely related to Mayer et 
al.’s (1995) concept of integrity, since among the biggest concerns of firms entering into 
alliances is the predictability of their partner’s behavior. In lack of prior experience with 
a particular partner, the next logical step is to rely on the reputation of that firm, which is 
a direct consequence of prior relational behavior (Granovetter, 1985). Research suggests 
that most firms are embedded in a social network of prior alliances through which they 
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are connected with one another either directly or indirectly (Kogut et al., 1993). The con-
cept of structural embeddedness focuses on the informational role of the position an or-
ganization occupies in the overall structure of the network (Gulati, 1998; Uzzi, 1996). 
Thus, the type of network in which a firm is embedded defines the opportunities poten-
tially available; its relative position in this structure and the types of interfirm ties it 
maintains defines its access to those opportunities (Uzzi, 1996). Within such a dense so-
cial network, reputational considerations play an important role in a firm’s potential for 
future alliances, because these social affiliations determine the firm’s perceived status 
and serve as a source of legitimacy. This is especially true for firms entering new markets 
or industries or collaborating across organizational and national boundaries, where 
affiliation with a known firm might signal quality and trustworthiness and thereby serve 
as a foundation for a favorable evaluation by a potential partner. Furthermore, a firm’s 
reputation can influence the perception of an entire industry. IBM serves as an example, 
since IBM has a reputation for dominating whatever business it enters (through 
commitment of resources), even if it arrives late. Thus, IBM’s involvement in life 
sciences is both a statement about the importance of life sciences research and an 
indication that more innovation is on the horizon. Hence, for a company looking for a 
partner to provide IT infrastructure to their life science applications, IBM may be 
perceived favorably due to its reputation as being credible and committed as a partner. By 
the same token, IBM seeks to partner with application providers of high quality and 
standard (measured as financial stability and a solid development team and based largely 
on reputation) to ensure a high-quality solution. Hence, firms like IBM, for whom 
strategic alliances (both national and international) is a natural part of their business, 
actively manage their reputation through, among many other things, targeted corporate 
and brand communication activities and assessment of corporate collaborative image 
acr
e 
ities. 
oss alliance portfolios. In terms of ISAs, the establishment of foreign trade councils by many countries to 
support international trade, which help firms obtain valuable information about potential 
foreign partner firms, serves as a source of reputational information. For instance, 
whereas the business license of a focal firm can provide information about its legal 
capacity, registered capital, and business scope, foreign trade councils can usually 
provide invaluable reputational information regarding local (consumer) perceptions of th
focal firm, its competitive position, and its relationship to local author
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A firm with a reputation of being honest, fair, and trustworthy gives one the first 
piece of evidence to take some initial risk (Barney and Hansen, 1994). Alternatively, 
once a firm has acquired a reputation for not being trustworthy in collaborative relation-
ships or in general, future partners will perceive this firm as a greater liability in terms of 
inter-firm collaboration. Hence, following Burt and Knez’s (1996) argument, I argue that 
particularly the historical trustworthiness of parties in previous interaction with others is 
important, and that it is the social context (e.g. networks) that makes reputational effects 
possible. Therefore, locating a partner with a good reputation seems to be an early indica-
tor of successful collaboration. 
  
Hypothesis 2: A favorable reputation is positively related to alliance performance. 
3. Learning potential  
As alliances increasingly become a fact of life in the business environment, exploiting 
the learning potential of alliances will become more important. By bringing together dif-
ferent firms with unique skills and capabilities, alliances can create powerful learning op-
portunities. However, without active management of the learning process and an under-
standing of the nature of alliance knowledge, many of these opportunities will remain un-
exploited. The acquisition of new organizational knowledge is increasingly becoming a 
managerial priority. As the global competitive environment continues to intensify, this 
priority takes on new significance. New knowledge provides the basis for organizational 
renewal and sustainable competitive advantage. In various studies, knowledge acquisition 
has been linked with operational performance as well as with the performance of specific 
organizational tasks (e.g. Epple et al., 1991; Doz, 1996). In bringing together firms with 
different skills and knowledge bases, alliances create unique learning opportunities for 
the partner firms. By definition, alliances involve a sharing of resources. In some cases, 
the shared resources are strictly financial, limiting partner learning opportunities, while in 
others access to knowledge is more profound. This access can be a powerful source of 
new knowledge that, in most cases, would not have been possible without the formal 
structure of an alliance. Partner firms that use this access to knowledge as the basis for 
learning have the opportunity to acquire knowledge that can be used to enhance partner 
strategy and performance. Despite the logical notion that alliances create learning oppor-
tunities, and although organizations often talk in glowing terms about their alliances' 
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learning potential, research suggests that learning through alliances is a difficult, frustrat-
ing, and often misunderstood process (Inkpen, 1996; Inkpen & Crossan, 1995).  
The formation of an alliance represents a strategic initiative that has the potential to 
create experiences, actions, and strategic choices that provide the basis for learning. 
However, the formation of the alliance cannot ensure that its learning potential will be 
realized. Accessibility is not sufficient for effective learning, however, the conscious ef-
forts of management in the formation stage of the alliance to assess the potential for 
learning by targeting partners with complementary skills and resources improves the like-
lihood of knowledge development during latter stages of the alliance. Moreover, if the 
initial motivational intent behind the alliance includes explicit attention to knowledge de-
velopment and learning and this intent is later manifested in considerable resource com-
mitment to knowledge development and internalization for commercial purposes through 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), one would expect a high potential for 
learning to have a positive impact on alliance performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3: A high learning potential is positively related to alliance performance. 
Post-Alliance Formation Factors 
4. Collaborative Know-How 
Once the alliance has been formed, prior experience at cooperating becomes essential 
to the management of a diverse portfolio of collaborative ties as well as to accumulate the 
capability to benefit from the resulting interdependencies (Powell et al., 1996). The im-
portance of collaborative know-how in relation to alliance performance is evidenced by 
Lei and Slocum (1992), who attribute alliance failure to lack of collaborative experience 
and understanding. Moreover, Simonin (1997) empirically found support for the emer-
gence of a distinct form of collaborative know-how, which emerges from past experience, 
and which helps achieve greater benefits in subsequent alliances. As suggested by Si-
monin (1997) and others, this collaborative know-how affects the ability of firms, en-
gaged in strategic alliances, to understand and adopt proper procedures and mechanisms 
for knowledge accumulation, transfer, interpretation, and diffusion. For instance, Toyota 
has developed an infrastructure, including a wide range of organizational routines that 
facilitates the transfer and diffusion of knowledge within its extended enterprise. Much of 
Toyota’s success is attributed to its ability to learn from- and with its partners (particu-
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larly suppliers) and these learning activities are coordinated by two major divisions: pur-
chasing and the Operations Management Consulting Division (OMCD). Key routines that 
help facilitate learning in the extended enterprise include the establishment of on-site 
consulting, supplier learning teams and problem-solving teams as well as employee rota-
tion and elaborate systems for performance feedback and process monitoring (Dyer, 
2000). Hence, the development of these key collaborative routines from prior collabora-
tive relationships has helped Toyota increase the level of performance of their dyadic re-
lationships by facilitating knowledge transfer and eliminating many of the sources of un-
certainty and disruptive noise involved in cooperation. Collaborating across national bor-
ders magnifies the complexity of alliance management due to increased uncertainty about 
market- and partner information. In addition, inter-partner cultural difference, whether at 
the national, industrial, or organizational level, can potentially hinder effective knowl-
edge transfer and learning in international strategic alliances. Establishment of formalized 
collaborative routines (for instance in the form of an alliance unit) as well as partnering 
with a local partner with previous (international) collaborative experience is likely to re-
duce cross-cultural problems.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Collaborative know-how is positively related to alliance performance. 
5. Trust 
Trust has been included in numerous relationship studies conducted in both domestic 
(see Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Morgan & Hunt, 1994) and international (see Johnson et 
al., 1996; Larson, 1992) settings. Most studies concentrate, however, on two key compo-
nents of trust; a cognitive component, derived from confidence in the reliability of a part-
ner, and a behavioral component, derived from confidence in the intentions, motivations, 
honesty, or benevolence of a partner. Despite this attention to trust in alliance literature, 
the majority of research on trust is anecdotal, with little evidence of economic benefits. 
One reason for this lack of evidence is the intangible nature of trust, making it hard to 
define, not to mention quantify and measure. Hence, trust’s impact on ISA bottom-line 
results remains somewhat of a mystery. Consequently, we need to measure performance 
differently in order to capture the real benefits of trust in international joint ventures. 
Trust among partners in alliances is obviously important, as it is in all relationships, 
however, in the extant literature, trust is treated as a residual term for the complex social-
psychological processes necessary for social action to occur (Koza & Lewin, 1998). 
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Since trust is a social phenomenon, both national culture and institutional arrangements 
have an impact on trust and the perception of trust. Hence, applying a single definition of 
trust is unlikely to capture the complexity of this concept, which might be the reason why 
useful measures of trust are lacking in the literature. Recognizing the problems of trust as 
a useful concept in terms of research, some authors have attempted to develop non-trust 
explanations for non-opportunistic behavior in strategic alliances, arguing that trust is 
nothing more than an emergent and epiphenomenal property of successful alliances 
(Madhok & Tallman, 1998). Despite these difficulties of defining and operationalizing 
trust, the importance of this factor, as it relates to alliance performance in international 
strategic alliances, is evident. For any strategic alliance to be formed and function, a 
minimum of inter-firm trust must exist. In fact, as argued by Arrow (1972: 357): ‘Virtu-
ally every commercial transaction conducted has within itself an element of trust’. The 
literature suggests that one of the most critical factors determining alliance performance 
is the degree of trust between the partners (Bleeke and Ernst, 1993; Buckley, 1992). Trust 
has been shown to increase cooperation, improve flexibility, lowering the cost of coordi-
nating activities, and increasing the level of knowledge transfer and potential for learning 
(Smith et al., 1995; Simonin, 1999). However, according to Sherman (1992: 78), ‘the 
biggest stumbling block to the success of alliances is the lack of trust’. Moreover, the 
need for trust seems particularly important for any transaction conducted over a period of 
time and across organizational and national boundaries, where the level of complexity 
makes it virtually impossible to monitor in detail all aspects of exchange.  
Trust is an important component of IJV performance because it provides for greater 
adaptability in an IJV, as well as improves knowledge exchange, a key component of or-
ganizational learning and IJV success (Dodgson, 1996; Das & Teng, 1997). Since the 
knowledge being exchanged may be not only tacit but also proprietorial (specific), and as 
such constitute important elements of a firm’s competence and competitiveness, high lev-
els of trust are positively related to knowledge transfer (Simonin, 1999). Uzzi (1996) re-
ported from his field study that trust acted as the governance mechanisms of embedded 
relationships and as such facilitated the exchange of especially tacit knowledge related 
capabilities and information. In other words, trust promotes voluntary, non-obligating 
exchanges of assets and services between actors. Hence, many researchers (see for in-
stance Park & Ungson, 1997; Das & Teng, 1997) suggest that trust is important because 
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it reduces the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, facilitates control through a shared- 
value system, and it tends to increase efficiency and improve performance. 
If, as noted by Williamson (1985: 19), “transaction costs are the economic equivalent 
of friction in physical systems”, then we may conceptualize trust as the behavioral ‘lubri-
cant’ that can improve a system’s (here an alliance’s) operating efficiency. Consequently, 
a significant outcome of trust is that it facilitates tighter social relationships and hence 
reduces uncertainty in transactions. In collaboration across organizational and national 
boundaries, where the level of complexity makes it virtually impossible to monitor in de-
tail all aspects of exchange, trust is even more important. Hence, as the level of trust in-
creases the (perceived) need to monitor diminishes2. It follows, then, that trust is an im-
portant determinant of alliance performance because it increases a firm’s access to exter-
nal knowledge and strengthens its ability to- in conjunction with its network partner- cre-
ate new innovative and efficient ways of combining existing knowledge-related capabili-
ties and resources in order to extract superior rents. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Trust is positively related to alliance performance. 
6. Protectiveness 
Transaction cost economics assumes that agents are opportunistic, demonstrating self-
interest and guile (Williamson, 1985). Williamson (1985) asserts that opportunism does 
not pose the same difficulties for transactions within firms as it does for transactions be-
tween firms. He provides three reasons: 1) common ownership of assets limits incentives 
for individuals within firms to be opportunistic, 2) internal organization is able to use au-
thority to direct behavior, and 3) individuals within firms are likely to be better informed 
about conditions or be better able to monitor behavior than those in different firms. 
Hence, the lesson of opportunism, Williamson maintains, is that contracts must recognize 
conditions, which promote opportunism and provide appropriate safeguards, such that 
contractual commitments become credible (Williamson, 1993). Strategic collaboration 
has been advanced - from a traditional Williamson-like transaction cost standpoint – as 
an intermediate form between market and hierarchy, in order to explain the existence and 
economic justification of these networks. As mentioned earlier, knowledge exchanged in 
a collaborative arrangement may be proprietorial and thus provide important elements of 
                                                 
2 Although this may in turn reduce the cost of knowledge exchange, it may also lower the amount of new 
knowledge created if it results in some level of complacency due to “overembeddedness”. 
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a firm’s defining competence and competitiveness. Therefore, consistent with the re-
source-based view of the firm, knowledge protectiveness is often seen as an appropriate 
safeguard against opportunistic behavior in strategic alliances. Because of inter-partner 
asymmetry of knowledge demand and supply, it is expected that partner protectiveness 
and accessibility to its knowledge will be correspondingly asymmetrical. Hence, in gen-
eral, international alliance partners are likely to be more protective of their knowledge 
resources when their competitive advantage relies on them. Consequently, in a situation 
of high competitive overlap between partners (for instance in a horizontal alliance), the 
firms will strive to restrict knowledge sharing because of the risk of knowledge spillover 
(Yan & Luo, 2001). 
As argued by Doz, Hamel, and Prahalad (1986), the transparency or permeability of 
the organizational membrane between partners can be regulated through the adoption of 
strict policies or the development of shielding mechanisms, such as “walling off” 
(Baughn et al., 1997) proprietary technology. In addition, gatekeepers can be assigned to 
filter information access and disclosure across organizational boundaries. However, the 
ability to learn through joint ventures does not simply rest on the firm’s internal absorp-
tive capability and willingness to learn; it also depends on the willingness of external 
sources to cooperate (i.e. minimize protectiveness) (Pisano, 1988). Reciprocity suggests 
that accessibility to a partner’s knowledge depends, to a large degree, upon the extent to 
which the focal firm is open with its own knowledge to the partner. Protectiveness not 
only reduces the amount of information exchanged but also leads to uncertainty and dis-
trust. Hence, Simonin (1999) found in his study of knowledge transfer in strategic alli-
ances that protectiveness was positively related to ambiguity, and hence negatively re-
lated to knowledge transfer, suggesting that protectiveness acts as a barrier to effective 
knowledge exchange. This argument is supported by Madhok & Tallman (1998), who 
argue that safeguarding may hinder learning (performance) in strategic alliances. Lyles 
and Salk (1996) furthermore suggest that when disruptive to the operation of the alliance, 
protectiveness will contribute to the escalation of cross-cultural and other conflicts be-
tween partners. Protectiveness, then, hinders the effective exchange of knowledge and 
resources, suggesting that in order for successful collaboration to take place in interna-
tional strategic alliances, the level of protectiveness should be at its lowest.   
 
Hypothesis 6: Protectiveness is negatively related to alliance performance. 
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7. Cultural Distance 
By their very nature, international strategic alliances are affected by differences in na-
tional cultures (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; Park & Ungson, 1997). The adverse affect 
of cultural differences between IJV partners on alliance performance has been suggested 
by several scholars (see Mjoen and Tallman, 1997). This is consistent with the traditional 
internationalization perspective, which suggests a negative relationship between national 
cultural distance and performance. In fact, as argued by Meschi (1997), most problems 
encountered in international joint ventures can be traced back to cultural factors, be they 
national or organizational. Lyles and Salk (1996) report that not only conflicts but also 
cultural misunderstandings rooted in cultural differences can minimize flows of informa-
tion and learning. Hence, the partner’s national or organizational culture has the potential 
to affect in depth all aspects of the collaboration, including performance.  
Empirical findings are inconsistent due to the methodological and theoretical confu-
sion related to the cultural distance construct (see Shenkar, 2001). For instance, Barkema 
and Vermeulen (1997) found that cultural distance (measured as uncertainty avoidance 
and long-term orientation) was positively related to IJV survival. This is supported by 
Barkema et al. (1997), who also found aggregate cultural distance to be significantly re-
lated to IJV survival. However, Chen and Boggs (1998) found that cultural distance de-
creased the perceived prospects of IJV continuation in their sample of Chinese IJVs. In 
addition, Killing (1983) found that joint ventures, where one partner is from a developing 
country and the other from a developed country, are more likely to lead to decision im-
passes due to divergent attitudes. Moreover, Beamish (1985) showed that such joint ven-
tures have a higher rate of failure than those formed between two firms both originating 
in developed countries. Similarly, Mowery et al. (1996) found that distance and cultural 
differences were key obstacles to inter-firm collaboration for U.S. firms engaged in inter-
national alliances compared to firms engaged in domestic alliances. Moreover, cultural 
asymmetry (Hamel, 1991) can sometimes lead to an unbalanced situation between part-
ners in their attempt to decode, transfer, and interpret knowledge.  
Despite the mixed results of prior research, empirical as well as anecdotal evidence 
suggests that cultural distance is an important component of IJV success, although the 
relationship can be debated. In summary, at least four interrelated negative effects of cul-
tural distance on IJV performance can be identified: (1) cultural distance can lead to 
communication problems, which may hamper knowledge exchange and inter-
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organizational learning,  (2) cultural distance can increase managerial conflicts due to 
misunderstandings, which may lead to additional costs, (3) cultural distance can influence 
partner firm approaches to conflict resolution, which may adversely impact operations, 
and (4) cultural distance can erode applicability of certain partner competencies, which 
may decrease the potential benefits from cooperation (Chen & Boggs, 1998; Park & Ung-
son, 1997; Parkhe, 1991). Hence, if cultural distance is measured as a multidimensional 
construct spanning national, organizational and communicative culture, one would expect 
the following relationship: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Cultural distance is negatively related to alliance performance. 
DATA COLLECTION AND METHOD 
This study involves Danish partner firms in international strategic alliances with partner 
firms from a variety of countries from predominantly Europe, North America and Asia. 
All alliances were still in existence up until 1995, however, the respondents were asked to 
select the most recent alliance when filling out the survey. Since no publicly available 
database of Danish firms engaging in international strategic alliances exist, a list of po-
tential firms was generated from the KOB database3. Through a targeted reduction of the 
initial database, consisting of all Danish firms and organizations, both public and private, 
I created a target sample base of 1851 private firms4. The reduction criteria were based on 
interviews with firms engaged in international strategic alliances (of which several had 
fewer than 30 employees), press announcements and research on how the database was 
constructed. As it was impossible to determine a priori which firms engage in interna-
tional strategic alliances and since my definition of international strategic alliances is 
broad, I decided to survey a rather large sample of private, Danish firms, with at least 20 
employees and a high degree of internationalization (evidenced by activities in more than 
one foreign country). Consequently, the sample consisted of a large subset of firms for 
                                                 
3 The KOB database is a comprehensive database of all registered Danish firms. The database is updated 
continuously by Kobmandstandens OplysningsBureau A/S. KOB is Denmark’s largest credit agency and 
data for the database comes from a variety of sources, including TDC (Teledenmark), CVR (Danish state 
register of firms) and each local municipality. In addition, KOB conducts more than 200,000 interviews per 
year and co-operate with the largest international credit agencies, who are all approved by Berne Union and 
members of the ICIA. KOB is a member of FEBIS, BIGNet and is connected with Eurogate. Additional 
information can be found at www.kob.dk. 
4 The original reduction resulted in 1859 firms. Although the KOB database is updated regularly I cross-
checked with other sources and this led to omission of 8 firms due to miscoding (i.e. out of business or par-
ent firm not Danish). 
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whom the survey was not relevant. However, the idea behind this sampling method was 
to capture as many of the firms engaged in international strategic alliances as possible. 
The first question on the survey was designed to identify membership of the desired sam-
ple (i.e. “has your firm engaged in an international strategic alliance – as defined..”). Re-
spondents were encouraged to log on to the web page even if their firm did not engage in 
an international strategic alliance as defined, since this would help identify the actual size 
of the sample. If respondents answered “No” to the first question regarding their in-
volvement in an international strategic alliance, they only had to fill out one more ques-
tion regarding preferred survey methodology for future questionnaires. 
While the KOB database provides some financial indicators and industry information, 
it is less useful when attempting to identify motivational factors and critical sociological 
dimensions pertaining to the management of these alliances. As the database is merely 
capturing firm specific information, no indication of alliance activity and/or management 
is reported. Hence, in order to obtain the requisite level of detail on strategic sociological 
management issues it was necessary to approach the Danish partners directly. To gener-
ate data from a fairly large sample and given time and cost restraints it was decided to 
administer a web-based survey. Since target firms were engaged in international activities 
and 91% (Statistics Denmark, 2001) of private Danish enterprises with more than 10 em-
ployees are reported to have access to the Internet, the survey was conducted in English 
through a web page. A preliminary test indicated that language was not a significant bar-
rier to target respondents as well as the convenience and time reducing aspects of a web 
survey were highly appreciated. Using English as the language of choice on the question-
naire furthermore enables extension of the study to include foreign partner firms. 
The questionnaire was compiled from several sources. First of all, a series of semi-
structured interviews with key managers of two Danish partner firms were conducted 
over a period of 4 months in order to identify relevant issues pertaining to the formation 
and management of international strategic alliances. One firm was at the negotiation 
stage when the first set of interviews was conducted; the other had been engaged in the 
alliance for several years, yielding a somewhat broad perspective of relevant issues. Sec-
ondly, a comprehensive literature review of strategic alliance and international joint ven-
ture literature yielded an impressive list of questions deemed relevant. On the basis of the 
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semi-structured interviews and the literature review a suitable questionnaire was devised 
and published on a web page. The questionnaire and web design was tested for language 
and design issues by MBA and Ph.D. students at a large West Coast (U.S.) research insti-
tution and for content by faculty at both a large West Coast (U.S.) research institution and 
a Danish business school. Finally, the survey was tested on site at the two Danish partner 
firms. This final stage allowed the researcher to observe the behavior of the respondents 
as they filled out the web survey and confusions, both in terms of content and design, 
were eliminated5. This final test indicated that the questionnaire was an appropriate in-
strument to obtain the data required. 
 
Web Survey and Reliability 
In order to increase reliability and response rate a formal letter was sent out to the 
managing director of all firms in the sample. Given the relatively small size of many of 
the firms in the sample and lack of an identified alliance manager in the database, letters 
were sent directly to the managing director with the hope that he would forward it to a 
potential alliance manager. The letter served two functions: to direct the target person to 
the web site and to ensure authenticity of the survey. The letter furthermore indicated a 
password (an 8 digit tax filing number that respondents would be familiar with) to be 
used in accessing the survey thereby limiting access only to members of the sample. 
Since the respondents were managing directors the length of the questionnaire was held 
at a minimum and the web page designed to make responding easy and quick (through 
the use of drop-down menus, radio buttons and check-boxes). Only few questions were 
open-ended and most responses were assessed using 7-point Likert-type scales. Appendix 
A illustrates the survey design and scale items. 
Prior research indicates that ordinal classification of perception is a more realistic task 
for respondents than use of interval or ratio measures (Geringer, 1991). Likert-type scales 
appeared to be more feasible than potentially more precise yet more complex scaling 
methods, especially given the limited amount of time the respondents were likely to de-
vote to the questionnaire. In order to be able to discriminate and capture some of the 
complexity in the responses a 7-point, rather than a five-point or three-point, Likert scale 
was chosen. In order to further increase reliability and reduce survey error, particular at-
                                                 
5 I am indebted to Dr. Don Dillman for his patience and help in the early stages of designing the web sur-
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tention was paid to principles for designing the web questionnaire in such a way as to re-
duce different types of error (see table 1 below for an overview of principles and specifi-
cation of the type of error each was intended to address).  
A total of 1851 letters were sent out in the spring of 2001. In exchange for their par-
ticipation in the study and to provide motivation and accurate responses, the respondents 
were assured of anonymity, security in data collection method (i.e. password protection 
and the host server belonged to the a renowned university) and were promised a summary 
report of the findings. After two reminders 362 firms had filled out the online survey of 
which 119 were usable (i.e. they had indicated engagement in an international strategic 
alliance). There were no missing data since the online survey was designed in a way that 
did not allow respondents to submit without filling out all relevant questions, however, 
all questions included a “not in a position to answer” option in order to allow respondents 
an “out”6. The initial response rate was about 20 per cent, however, due to the sampling 
technique a more realistic response rate can be derived by reducing the sample by the 
number of non-respondents for whom the survey was not relevant. As I suspected a large 
proportion of non-respondents did not belong to the sample of firms engaging in interna-
tional strategic alliances, I called 50 (randomly selected) firms among the non-
respondents in order to test this hypothesis and disprove non-response bias. As predicted, 
84 per cent of the non-respondents indicated that they did not belong to the sample (i.e. 
did not engage in international strategic alliances), 10 per cent indicated (indirectly) 
membership of the sample but would not fill out the survey due to time constraints or 
company policies. 
                                                                                                                                                 
vey. 
6 “Not in a position to answer” was coded as missing data during data analyses. 
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Table 1:  Sources of survey error and principles for dealing with these 
        
 
 
Type of Error 
 
(Source: Adapted and modified from Dillman et al., 1998 and Dillman, 2000.) 
 Sampling Coverage Measure-
ment 
Non-
response 
Motivational welcome screen, capti-
vating first question, and use of help 
(?) buttons for instructions 
    
X 
PIN number for limiting access only 
to people in sample 
 
X 
 
X 
  
Presenting each question in a con-
ventional format similar to traditional 
paper design 
 
 
 
  
 
X 
 
 
X 
Restraining the use of color in order 
to maintain readability and meas-
urement properties 
   
 
X 
 
Ensuring accessibility and view abil-
ity for all users: avoid the use of 
JAVA etc. and restrain screen width 
to 640 x 480 
  
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
Carefully design and consider the 
mode implications of drop-down 
boxes etc. 
   
 
X 
 
Web-survey is one long document, 
allowing the user to scroll back and 
forth between questions. Questions 
appear in logical order. 
  
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
Restricting number of answer 
choices to amount that can be dis-
played on one screen 
   
 
X 
 
Restraining the use of question struc-
tures that have known measurement 
problems on paper surveys (e.g. 
check-all-that-apply and open-ended 
questions) 
   
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Only 2 per cent (1 firm) was engaged in international strategic alliance activity and filled 
out the survey after the phone call. Hence, the final number of usable responses was 120. 
Since 84 percent of the firms contacted after the survey had been conducted did not be-
long to the sample, it seems fair to assume a percent-wise reduction of the leftover non-
respondents in order to establish an estimate of the “relevant” sample. After the percent-
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wise reduction, the net response rate was 33 per cent (120 of 364). Figure 2 depicts the 
sampling approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Sampling Approach 
Cross-check for 
miscoding 
Final net response rate after per-
cent-wise reduction = 33% 
Call placed to 50 non-respondents to reduce non-response bias and establish 
percentage of non-respondents who were not part of sample (i.e. had not been 
involved in an ISA). 84% did not belong to sample 
Responses received from 362 firms, 
of which 119 (32.9%) had been en-
gaged in ISAs. Initial response rate = 
19.6% 
Reduction criteria: 
- Minimum 20 employees 
- Limited private firm 
- Multiple export areas 
- Danish parent company 
Target sample after reduction 
 
N=1851 
Press announcements 
about international stra-
tegic alliances 
Interviews with firms 
engaged in international 
strategic alliances 
Research into database 
design, structure and 
data collection method 
KOB database with all 
registered Danish firms 
 
N=530,000+ 
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Non-response Analysis 
The main problem with mailed, as well as web-based, surveys is the possibility of 
bias resulting from low response rates (Fox et al., 1998). In order to test for possible non-
response bias, respondents and non-respondents were compared in terms of size and 
turnover. No statistically significant differences were found. Another method for testing 
for non-response bias is to compare early respondents to late respondents, since it has 
been argued that late respondents, especially after repeated follow-ups, are similar in 
composition to non-respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Churchill, 1991).  Al-
though time consuming, however, it seems more appropriate to contact non-respondents 
in order to establish the reason for not responding. Hence, following the survey, I con-
tacted 50 randomly selected non-respondents. There was no statistically significant dif-
ference between this sample and the other non-respondents or this sample and the re-
spondents in terms of overall composition (size and turnover). Of the 50 firms contacted, 
42 (84%) did not engage in international alliance activity in the period specified in the 
survey. Of the 8 (16%) that did indicate international alliance activity, 50 percent (4) said 
they had no time to fill out the survey, 37.5 percent (3) would not participate due to com-
pany policies and the reminding 12.5 percent (1) filled out the survey after several phone 
calls. These findings are consistent with the respondents to the survey of which 65.9 per 
cent (243) indicated no alliance activities as specified in the survey. Furthermore, 5 firms 
contacted the author and gave “company policies” as reason for not responding, whereas 
representatives from 2 firms took the time to contact the author and tell him that they did 
not have time to fill out the survey. The results suggest that non-response bias does not 
pose a problem for the interpretation and generalizability of the findings of the study. 
Consequently, the sample can be considered representative of the target population. 
 
Sample Characteristics 
The sample is composed of 120 international strategic alliances of which 48 are eq-
uity joint ventures (EJVs) and 70 are non-equity joint ventures (NEJVs). Two respon-
dents did not indicate alliance form. The time dimension of the study runs from 1985 to 
2001 with 94.2 per cent of the alliances formed in the period 1995-2001. Due to the dy-
adic nature of the study, where the alliance had more than one foreign partner, the Danish 
respondent was asked to identify the ‘most important’ foreign partner. As a result, the 
data set comprises 73 alliances (60.8% of total) with partners in Western Europe, pre-
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dominantly with EU members (94.5%); 15 alliances (16.7% of total) with North Ameri-
can, mostly United States, partners; and 10 alliances (8.3% of total) with Asian, primarily 
Indian and Chinese, partners. The rest of the alliances were formed with partners from 
Australia, Eastern Europe, the Baltic States or South America.  
In terms of degree of international experience, the Danish firms were asked about the 
year of their first export, first foreign subsidiary and first international strategic alliance. 
98 firms (81.7%) responded to the question about export experience with the lowest 
number of years (reported year subtracted from 2001) being 2 and the highest being 113. 
The mean and standard deviation for export experience is 23.41 and 18.21. 69 firms 
(57.5%) reported on year of establishment of first foreign subsidiary with the lowest 
number of years (reported year subtracted from 2001) being 3 and the highest being 97. 
The mean and standard deviation for establishment of first foreign subsidiary is 16.81 and 
16.75. 91 firms (75.8%) reported on international strategic alliance experience ranging 
from 0 years to 89 years of experience (reported year subtracted from 2001). The mean 
and standard deviation for international strategic alliance experience is 10.57 and 12.67. 
A combined international experience construct was computed in order to show the com-
posite international experience of the sample. The mean and standard deviation of this 
construct is 23.68 and 19.27. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of degree of interna-
tional experience. Of the sample, 88 or 73.3 per cent furthermore indicated that they are 
currently involved in other international strategic alliances, indicating the presence of a 
high level of international collaborative experience in the sample. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of degree of international experience 
 
Level of internationalization Mean Standard de-
viation 
Export experience 23.41 18.21 
Subsidiary experience 16.81 16.75 
International SA experience 10.57 12.67 
Combined international experience* 23.68 19.27 
  * Combined international experience is a construct based on the earliest reported  
  international engagement. Although there is a clear trend of incremental inter- 
  nationalization from export to establishment of subsidiary followed later by  
  engagement in international strategic alliances, some firms engaged in ISAs before  
  engaging in export or establishing foreign subsidiaries. 
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The industry sectors of the alliances are as follows: low-tech manufacturing (11.7%), 
high-tech manufacturing (57.5%), wholesale (19.2%), retail (1.7%), consultancy (3.3%) 
and other services (6.7%). In total, 83 (69.2%) of the alliances are in the manufacturing 
sector and 37 (30.8%) in the tertiary sector. Table 3 shows distribution of industry sec-
tors. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of the sample firms according to industry sector 
 
Industry Number of 
firms 
Percent of 
firms 
Manufacturing (high-tech)* 14 11.7 
Manufacturing (low-tech) 69 57.5 
Wholesale 23 19.2 
Retail 2 1.7 
Consultancy 4 3.3 
Other services 8 6.7 
Total 120 100.1 
  * Based on the level of technical sophistication in output. Included in this category 
  are firms within biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, chemical, 
computer and electronics industry. All other manufacturing is considered low-tech.  
 
The absolute size of the Danish partner was measured in terms of turnover and num-
ber of employees (generated from the KOB database), however, no reliable data on the 
absolute size of the foreign partner were obtained. Among the Danish partners, the num-
ber of employees ranged from 20 (the minimum) to 3500 with a mean of 194.91 and a 
standard deviation of 426.751.Turnover data only existed for 58 firms and ranged from 
9,112 (1000DKK) to 3,966,761 (1000 DKK) with a mean of 599,225.09 (1000DKK) and 
a standard deviation of 854,248.76. Hence, although the majority of the sample comprises 
what would normally be termed small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), in a Danish 
context the sample is highly representative of the entire sample of registered private Dan-
ish firms. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of absolute size.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of firm size 
 
 Mean Standard devia-
tion 
Size (# of employees) 194.91 426.75 
Size (Turnover in 
1000DKK)* 
 
599,225.09 
 
854,248.76 
* Data for this measure were available for 58 firms. The most current year  
 (1998-2000) of report was used. 
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Operationalizing Performance 
To cover the complexity of this construct, a principal component analysis with ‘vari-
max’ rotation was performed on items tied to financial, operational, and effectiveness 
dimensions, as recommended by Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986). The factor analy-
sis produced four factors with eigenvalues greater than one, combined accounting for 
85.4 percent of the variance in the data.  
The first factor, relational equity, explained 29.4 percent of the variation and had an 
eigenvalue of 4.26. This factor was based on items capturing the value of the relational 
exchanges with external constituents through marketing, distribution, and customer ser-
vice (see Morgan and Hunt, 1994). As the relationships to customers, partners, suppliers, 
and investors improve so does the performance of the alliance (three items, Cronbach’s α 
= 0.91)    
The second factor, financial performance, explained an additional 19.3 percent of the 
variation and had an eigenvalue of 1.72. This factor represented the relationship between 
financial performance and perception of overall alliance performance. The scale was 
based on three items from Glaister and Buckley (1999) reporting actual performance ver-
sus projected performance in terms of sales, market share, and profitability. This scale 
had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.79.   
The third factor, learning, explained 18.1 percent of the variation and had an eigen-
value of 1.32. This factor captured learning issues of performance measured as level of 
knowledge transfer and knowledge development resulting from the alliance. This scale 
had two items with a Cronbach’s α = 0.88. 
The last factor, efficiency, measured the degree to which the alliance had resulted in 
more effective/efficient procedures and lower operation costs. This factor explained 16.6 
percent of the variation and had an eigenvalue of 1.04. Cronbach’s alpha for this two-
item construct was 0.76. 
Although there is much disagreement in the management literature on a valid measure 
of performance, the multidimensional operationalization proposed here seeks to over-
come some of the drawbacks of prior measures of performance that relied heavily on 
measures like survival and duration of the alliance (cf. Harrigan, 1988). Appendix B 
shows the actual items. 
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Measures of Determinants of Performance  
The variables discussed in the section, which develops the hypotheses, are summa-
rized in table 5. This table indicates the method of variable measurement, frequencies 
when appropriate, and the direction of the hypothesized relationships. Prior experience 
with partner was measured as a dichotomous variable (1 or 0) according to whether or not 
prior relationships between the two firms existed. Partner reputation refers to the impor-
tance of the reputation of the partner when selecting the partner for the alliance. Reputa-
tion was measured on an ordinal scale from 1-7 according to importance of reputation 
when selecting this partner. Learning potential refers to the intent behind the alliance in 
terms of technology/knowledge development. The focal firm was asked a series of ques-
tions regarding the underlying motivation for collaboration and partner choice in terms of 
access to technology/knowledge in order to assess the learning potential of the partner-
ship. The three-item construct had an alpha value of 0.84. 
According to Lei and Slocum (1992), collaborative know-how has an important im-
pact on performance. In this study, collaborative know-how is the extent to which the 
firm possesses collaborative experience. Following Simonin (1997, 1999) the focal firm 
was asked to assess itself in terms of level of know-how in various alliance-related tasks, 
such as identifying and selecting a partner, experience with international partner, and alli-
ance management. Cronbach’s alpha for this construct was 0.77. Building on Morgan and 
Hunt’s (1994) findings that trust is key to relational performance, trust, in this study, is 
measured as a multi-item construct on an ordinal scale from 1-7. The first item asked re-
spondents to evaluate the overall level of trust between partners, whereas the other two 
items were adopted from Cummings and Bromiley’s (1996) instrument to measure inter-
organizational trust, measuring confidence in partner to move joint projects forward and 
the risk of opportunism. Cronbach’s α for this construct was 0.78. Protectiveness is dis-
tinct from trust in that it measures the degree of internal stickiness (Szulanski, 1996). Fol-
lowing Simonin (1999) this construct was measured as a two-item construct on ordinal 
scales from 1-7, based on the extent to which the partner firm has restricted the focal 
firm’s access to knowledge/competencies (according to the focal firm) and the extent to 
which the focal firm has restricted its partner’s access to knowledge/ competencies 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.82). The final construct hypothesized to influence alliance perform-
ance in international strategic alliances is cultural distance.  
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Table 5: Measurement of Variables and Expected Direction of Signs 
Variables Measurement Expected Sign 
  P1 P2 P3 P4 
Dependent variables 
- Relational equity (P1) 
 
 
 
- Financial performance 
(P2) 
 
 
- Learning (P3) 
 
 
 
- Efficiency (P4) 
 
 
 
Multi-item construct (three items), measured as ordinal scales 
from 1=’Worse than expected’ to 3=’Better than expected’. See 
text for details. 
 
Multi-item construct (three items), measured as ordinal scales 
from 1=’Worse than expected’ to 3=’Better than expected’. See 
text for details. 
 
Multi-item construct (two items), measured as ordinal scales from 
1=’Worse than expected’ to 3=’Better than expected’. See text 
for details. 
 
Multi-item construct (two items), measured as ordinal scales from 
1=’Strongly agree’ to 7=’Strongly disagree’. Both items were 
reverse coded in survey. See text for details. 
    
Independent variables 
Pre-alliance formation  
- Prior experience with 
partner 
 
 
- Partner reputation 
 
- Learning potential 
 
Post-alliance formation 
-  Collaborative know-
how 
 
 
- Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
- Protectiveness 
 
 
- Cultural distance 
 
 
Dichotomous variable (1 or 0) measured according to whether 
prior relationships between the partners existed (n=90) or not 
(n=29). One firm was not in a position to answer. 
 
Ordinal scale from 1=’Low’ to 7=’High’. 
 
Multiple-item construct (three items), measured as ordinal scales 
from 1=’Low’ to 7=’High’. See text for details. 
 
Multi-item construct (four items), measured as ordinal scales 
from 1=’No know-how to 7=’Extensive know-how’ and 1=’Not 
at all’ to 7=’Quite a lot’. See text for details.  
 
Construct consists of three items, measured as ordinal scales. 
Level of trust among partners range from 1=’Low’ to 7=’High’. 
The two other scales range from 1=’Strongly agree’ to 
7=’Strongly disagree’: both items were reverse coded in survey. 
See text for details 
 
Construct consists of two items, measured as ordinal scales from 
1=’Not at all’ to 7=’Quite a lot’. See text for details 
 
Construct consists of three items, measured as ordinal scales from 
1=’Strongly disagree’ to 7=’Strongly agree’. See text for details 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
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- 
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+ 
 
 
 
+ 
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+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Control variables 
- Alliance form 
 
 
 
- Size 
 
Dummy variable (1 or 0) measured according to whether the alli-
ance was an equity joint venture (n = 48) or a non-equity joint 
venture (n = 70). Two firms were not in a position to answer 
 
Raw score of number of employees 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 
? 
 
 28
Based on Mowery et al. (1996), Grant (1996), Harrigan (1986), Lyles and Salk (1996), 
and Simonin (1999), cultural distance was measured as a multi-item construct on ordinal 
scales from 1-7. Attempting to overcome some of the criticism of this construct (see 
Shenkar, 2001) the items measure several dimensions of cultural distance; national cul-
tural distance, communicative distance, and organizational cultural distance. Cronbach’s 
alpha for this construct was 0.83. Appendix B shows the actual items. 
  
Control Variables 
As indicated above, the sample includes different types of alliances, categorized ac-
cording to whether or not a separate entity was established. If a separate entity was estab-
lished, the alliance was coded as an equity joint venture (EJV) and conversely, if no sepa-
rate entity was established, the alliance was coded as a non-equity joint venture (NEJV). 
As noted by several authors (Geringer, 1991; Saxton, 1997; Gulati, 1995), the administra-
tive governance form of a collaborative arrangement may testify as to the motives of the 
partner companies and hence have an impact on expected performance outcome. The un-
derlying assumption is that there is a correlation between alliance form and commitment 
since EJVs typically involve considerable financial investment and managerial time and 
hence are assumed to represent a longer term commitment than NEJVs. To control for 
alliance type, this variable was entered as a dummy, coded 1 for EJVs and 0 for NEJVs. 
The size of the firm was entered as a raw score of number of employees7 in order to con-
trol for the possibility that alliance performance may be spuriously higher in large firms. 
The industry sector of the alliance was also entered as a dummy variable, coded 1 for the 
manufacturing sector and 0 for the tertiary sector in the initial model, however, the results 
showed that industry had no impact and hence it was omitted in the final analyses in or-
der to increase statistical power. Removing the effects of the control variables improves 
confidence that the findings center on the hypothesized relationships, above and beyond 
the effects of exogenous influences at the firm, alliance, and industry level.  
 
Test Methodology 
Pearson correlations were run between each of the hypothesized variables and the 
four performance variables in order to test for individual relationships. Then, three dis-
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tinct multiple regression models8 were run to determine which combinations of factors 
predicted alliance performance. Model 1 included the pre-alliance formation variables; 
Model 2 included the post-alliance formation variables, and Model 3 included both sets 
of variables. Alliance form and company size were treated as control variables in the re-
gression procedure. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 6 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables in 
the order hypothesized. As could be expected, the dependent variables are relatively 
highly correlated, however, the correlation coefficients are 0.5 and below, indicating that 
the four measures of performance are capturing different aspects of perceived alliance 
performance. 
In general, Relational equity is relatively strongly correlated with Prior experience 
with partner, Trust, Protectiveness and Cultural distance (each significant correlation has 
the expected sign). Similarly, there are relative strong significant correlations between the 
Financial performance measure and Prior experience with partner, Collaborative know-
how, Trust, and Protectiveness (each significant correlation has the expected sign). The 
Learning performance measure correlates with Prior experience with partner, Partner 
reputation, Collaborative know-how, Trust, and Protectiveness (each significant correla-
tion has the expected sign). Finally, I observe high significant correlations between the 
Efficiency performance measure and Collaborative know-how, Trust, and Cultural dis-
tance (all with the expected sign). 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The number of employees was chosen as indicator of size due to a lack of consistency and missing data in 
the turnover data set. 
8 When variables are ordinally scaled, as in this study, such analyses deviate from the regression assump-
tion of interval data (Michel & Hambrick, 1992). However, the work of Michel and Hambrick (1992), 
Keats and Hitt (1988) and others has demonstrated that the use of ordinal scales does not present a serious 
problem. 
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TABLE 6: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 
 
Variable    Mean  s.d.   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12  
 
1. Relational equity   2.35 0.66  
2. Financial performance  2.36 0.74 0.50**  
3. Learning    2.21 0.71 0.39** 0.34** 
4. Efficiency    3.73 1.62 0.23** 0.38** 0.06 
5. Prior experience with partner 0.75 0.44 0.20* 0.16* 0.21* 0.09 
6. Partner reputation   5.23 1.54 0.14   - 0.05 0.16*   - 0.06 0.19* 
7. Learning potential   3.67 1.65   - 0.00   - 0.14 0.12   - 0.09   - 0.13 0.36** 
8. Collaborative know-how  4.46 1.08 0.10 0.21*  0.17*  0.22** 0.04   - 0.05 0.12 
9. Trust    4.78 1.41 0.36** 0.44** 0.20* 0.29** 0.20*   - 0.06   - 0.41** 0.14 
10. Protectiveness   2.67 1.57   - 0.35** -0.47**  -0.40** 0.01   - 0.20* 0.07 0.01 0.24** - 0.29** 
11. Cultural distance   3.86 1.78   - 0.17* 0.01   - 0.12   - 0.18*   -0.18*   - 0.04   - 0.11   - 0.37** - 0.15   - 0.04 
12. Alliance forma   0.41 0.49 0.02 0.17*   - 0.20*   -0.14   - 0.11   - 0.35** - 0.22** - 0.27** 0.06   - 0.17* 0.22** 
13. Sizeb           194.91 426.75   - 0.01 0.01   - 0.12   - 0.11   - 0.18* 0.07   - 0.05 0.20* 0.09 0.15 0.05   - 0.05 
 
a Equity or non-equity; b number of employees;  * p < 0.05, one-tailed test; ** p < 0.01, one-tailed test.
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Table 7 displays the results of the multiple regression analyses for combinations of 
the independent variables with alliance performance as the dependent variables. The vari-
ance inflation factor (VIF) was used to assess multicollinearity. The VIF scores (all less 
than 1.7) suggested that while multicollinearity does exist, it will not significantly influ-
ence the stability of the parameter estimates (Dielman, 1991). The threat of unequal vari-
ances (heteroscedasticity) was checked by the Levane test. The results (p>.10 for all pre-
dictor variables) showed no pattern of increasing or decreasing residuals, thus suggesting 
the presence of homoscedasticity in the regression test.    
 Model 1 shows the effects of the pre-alliance formation variables on alliance per-
formance. The Learning performance measure (P3) is the only dependent variable for 
which this model is significant at the p<0.05 level (F=2.40, R2=0.10). The only variable 
with a significant coefficient (p<0.05) is Prior experience with partner, which is posi-
tively correlated as anticipated. 
 Model 2 captures the effects of the post-alliance formation variables on alliance per-
formance. For Relational equity as the dependent variable (P1) this model is significant at 
the p<0.01 level (F=5.55, R2=0.23). The coefficients for Trust and Protectiveness are 
both significant at the p<0.01 level in the predicted direction. For Financial performance 
as the dependent variable (P2) the model is significant at the p<0.01 level (F=14.27, 
R2=0.43). The coefficients for Collaborative know-how and Trust are significant at the 
p<0.01 level with the anticipated signs. The coefficients for Protectiveness and Cultural 
distance are significant at the p<0.05 level with the anticipated direction (negative) for 
Protectiveness but the opposite (positive) for Cultural distance. For Learning (P3) as the 
dependent variable the model is significant at the p<0.01 level (F=7.51, R2=0.29). The 
coefficients for Collaborative know-how and Protectiveness are significant at the p<0.01 
level with the anticipated signs. For Efficiency (P4) as the dependent variable the model 
is significant at the p<0.01 level (F=3.56, R2=0.16). The coefficient for Trust is signifi-
cant at the p<0.01 level in the direction anticipated. 
 Model 3 represents the full model with all independent variables. As such, this model 
offers a stronger, multivariate test of the hypotheses and allows examination of how the 
pre- and post alliance formation variables simultaneously affect alliance performance.  
For Relational equity as the dependent variable (P1) this model is significant at the 
p<0.01 level (F=4.53, R2=0.27, adjusted R2=0.21).  
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TABLE 7: Results of Multiple Regression Analysesa 
 
Variable    Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
 
     Pre-alliance formation  Post-alliance formation  Full Model 
 
     P1b P2c P3d P4e  P1 P2 P3 P4  P1 P2 P3 P4 
 
Constant                                      1.79** 2.14** 1.85** 4.75**  2.01** 0.85* 2.10** 1.31  1.29** 0.55 1.39** 1.90 
Prior experience with partner    0.19* 0.17* 0.18* 0.06       0.06 0.02 0.06   - 0.00 
Partner reputation                       0.14 0.01 0.05   - 0.10       0.17* 0.09 0.11   - 0.07 
Learning potential                             - 0.01   - 0.09 0.09   - 0.09       0.07   - 0.02 0.10   - 0.02 
Collaborative know-how        0.10 0.37** 0.23** 0.16  0.12 0.39** 0.24** 0.15 
Trust            0.24** 0.27** 0.06 0.29**  0.27** 0.26** 0.10 0.29** 
Protectiveness                  - 0.31** - 0.45** - 0.45** 0.06           - 0.30** -0.45** - 0.44** 0.06 
Cultural distance                 - 0.11 0.13* 0.00   - 0.05           - 0.09 0.13* 0.03   - 0.05 
Alliance form                             0.09 0.18*   -0.15   - 0.19*  0.00 0.15*   - 0.22** - 0.10  0.09 0.19*   - 0.16*   - 0.13 
Size                                            0.02 0.04   - 0.10   - 0.10  0.00   - 0.02   - 0.12   - 0.17*                - 0.00   - 0.03   - 0.11   - 0.17** 
 
R2                                           0.06 0.07 0.10 0.06  0.23 0.43 0.29 0.16  0.27 0.44 0.31 0.17 
Adjusted R2                                 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02  0.19 0.40 0.25 0.12  0.21 0.39 0.26 0.10 
F     1.45 1.68 2.40* 1.36                5.55**14.27**  7.51**   3.56**  4.53** 9.56** 5.61** 2.42** 
a Entries represent standardized regression coefficients,  N=120; * p<0.05, one-tailed test; ** p<0.01, one-tailed test, b P1 refers to Relational Equity, c P2 refers to Financial Per-
formance, d P3 refers to Learning, e P4 refers to Efficiency 
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Individual coefficients for Partner reputation (p<0.05), Trust (p<0.01) and Protectiveness 
(p<0.01) are significant in the predicted direction. For Financial performance (P2) as the 
dependent variable this model is significant at the p<0.01 level (F=9.56, R2=0.44, ad-
justed R2=0.39). Individual coefficients for Collaborative know-how (p<0.01), Trust 
(p<0.01), Protectiveness (p<0.01), and Cultural distance (p<0.05) are significant. All 
signs of these coefficients are as expected except for Cultural distance. For Learning (P3) 
as the dependent variable this model is significant at the p<0.01 level (F=5.61, R2=0.31, 
adjusted R2=0.26). Individual coefficients for Collaborative know-how and Protective-
ness are significant at the p<0.01 level in the direction anticipated. For Efficiency (P4) as 
the dependent variable this model is significant at the p<0.01 level (F=2.42, R2=0.17, ad-
justed R2=0.10). The coefficient for Trust is significant at the p<0.01 level and the sign is 
as expected. 
 In terms of model fit, for Relational equity (P1) as the dependent variable, the full 
model explains an additional 19 percent of the variance in performance over the model, 
which includes only the pre-alliance formation variables (Model 1). Compared to the 
model, which includes only the post-alliance formation variables (Model 2), the full 
model explains an additional 2 percent of the variance. Similar results can be observed 
for Learning (P3) as the dependent variable, whereas Financial performance (P2) and Ef-
ficiency (P4) are best explained in terms of the post-alliance formation variables. Hence, 
including both pre- and post alliance formation factors seems to explain certain aspects of 
alliance performance (i.e. Relational equity and Learning) better than a model that incor-
porates either set of variables alone. On the other hand, Financial performance and Effi-
ciency seems to be explained best by the post-alliance formation variables, although the 
differences between Model 2 and the full model (Model 3) are tiny. 
 Overall, the test offers strong support for hypotheses 4 (Collaborative know-how), 5 
(Trust) and 6 (Protectiveness). There is weak support for hypothesis 2 (Partner reputa-
tion), however, contrary to hypothesis 7, Cultural distance shows a positive relationship 
with performance. The findings do not lend support for hypotheses 1 (Prior experience) 
and hypothesis 3 (Learning potential).    
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DISCUSSION 
 Although many will agree that the performance of international strategic alliances of-
ten falls short of expectations, our understanding of the underlying determinants of alli-
ance performance is rather limited. The purpose of this study is to further the understand-
ing of the complexity of performance in interfirm relationships, across national borders, 
as it relates to different stages in the development process of the alliance. To accomplish 
this, a set of pre-alliance formation variables; prior experience with partner, partner repu-
tation, and learning potential, and a set of post-alliance formation variables; collaborative 
know-how, trust, protectiveness, and cultural distance were identified and their individual 
and simultaneous effect on alliance performance assessed. In order to unlock the “black 
box” of alliance performance, four different aspects of alliance performance were meas-
ured. The most interesting finding for the pre-alliance formation variables was that part-
ner reputation (when selecting the partner) is important for alliance performance meas-
ured as relational equity. Not surprisingly, selecting a partner with a favorable reputation 
has a positive impact on subsequent relational exchanges with customers, suppliers, and 
distributors as predicted in hypothesis 2. The fact that partner reputation has no effect on 
the other three performance measures suggests that reputation is a complex subjective 
construct, which direct effect on alliance performance seems to be more psychological in 
terms of relational marketing than internal performance.  
 For the post-alliance formation variables, the findings confirm the importance of col-
laborative know-how, trust and a low level of protectiveness in managing the alliance. 
Collaborative know-how (Hypothesis 4) seems particularly important for financial per-
formance and learning, indicating that experience in alliance management improves the 
effectiveness of alliance activities. Since efficiency is measured at the focal firm level, it 
is hardly surprising that collaborative know-how is not significantly affecting this meas-
ure. Perhaps more surprising is it that collaborative know-how also does not affect rela-
tional equity. Given the importance of relational equity for alliance performance, one 
would expect firms with alliance experience to better understand the value of relational 
exchanges. Perhaps the results attest to the difficulty of transforming previous, somewhat 
tacit, knowledge into useful mechanisms for managing relational equity in subsequent 
relationships. As predicted, trust (Hypothesis 5) and Protectiveness (Hypothesis 6) are 
highly significant across most performance variables. Hence, this study provides support 
for previous findings of the importance of trust and relationship characteristics in explain-
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ing alliance behavior and success (e.g. Saxton, 1997). Moreover, as noted by Simonin 
(1999) and others, protectiveness has a negative impact on knowledge transfer and alli-
ance performance. This study confirms these findings as protectiveness is negatively cor-
related with both learning, relational equity, and financial performance. The findings that 
trust is not affecting learning and protectiveness is not affecting efficiency indicate that 
trust and protectiveness are distinct constructs.  
 Cultural distance was predicted to have a negative impact on performance, however, 
the findings show this construct to have a slight positive effect on financial performance 
thereby adding to the ongoing debate about the theoretical and methodological properties 
of this construct as well as the inconsistent empirical findings (for a thorough discussion 
see Shenkar, 2001). As suggested by Morosini (1998) and others, cultural differences, 
particularly when measured at different levels, have the potential for synergy as well as 
disruption. Perhaps controlling for closing distance mechanisms such as cultural attrac-
tion (both organizationally and geographically), acculturation and level of internationali-
zation would yield more consistent results. An alternative explanation for the lack of sup-
port for the negative relationship between cultural distance and performance could be the 
fact that about 61 percent (73) of the partner firms in this study were from Western 
Europe with most of them (69) from other European Union countries. Although the 
European Union arguably is still far from being culturally integrated, the cultural distance 
between EU countries can be assumed to be relatively lower in general than the cultural 
distance between EU countries and non-EU countries, particularly when measured as a 
composite of national, organizational, and communicative distance. Hence, the political, 
monetary, and cultural integration of the EU may have suppressed the effect of cultural 
distance on alliance performance. Finally, it is possible, as empirically shown by Simonin 
(1999), that other factors, such as collaborative know-how and absorptive capacity, exert 
moderating effects on the relationship between cultural distance and alliance perform-
ance. 
 The moderate correlations between the measures of performance together with the 
finding that the list of significant independent variables differ somewhat for each model 
when varying the dependent variable suggests that the four performance measures are 
capturing different aspects of alliance performance. The Relational equity measure is a 
subjective assessment of alliance relationship performance. Conceptually this measure is 
a proxy for the extent to which the alliance is successful in managing its relational equity 
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that is its relational exchanges with customers, suppliers, and distributors. The Financial 
performance measure is a subjective assessment of alliance performance in terms of 
meeting its financial objectives. Learning, on the other hand, is a measure of the extent to 
which the alliance has resulted in development of new technology/knowledge, regardless 
of whether this has been commercialized or not (i.e. the financial impact might not have 
been recorded yet).The final performance measure, Efficiency, taps into the perception of 
whether or not the alliance has led to process modifications and operational efficiencies 
for the focal firm.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Although the use of subjective performance measures provides much needed informa-
tion regarding the extent to which the IJV has achieved its overall objectives, these types 
of measures remain subjective and are thus exposed to serious limitations and biases. One 
such limitation stems from the data collection methodology of using respondents from 
one partner only. Clearly, collecting data from each parent of the IJV regarding its level 
of satisfaction with the IJV would enhance the reliability of the subjective measures, 
however, it also presents a myriad of logistical and cost barriers. Hence, the key issue is 
whether data collected from one parent represents a reliable measure of IJV performance 
and even a reliable estimate of the other partner’s perception of this performance. On this 
issue, Geringer (1991) found significant positive correlations between the two parent 
firms’ assessments of the IJV performance. Moreover, Geringer (1991) also found sup-
port for his hypothesis regarding a parent’s actual reported satisfaction with IJV perform-
ance and the perceptions by its partner. In addition, only very few studies have tested the 
consistency between objective and subjective measures of performance in alliances and 
although some initial support for this relationship has been shown (cf. Geringer, 1991), 
more formal testing of the consistency between objective and subjective measures of IJV 
performance is needed. Hence, reliance on a single parent company respondent as a data 
source appears to be a justifiable option, particularly when the respondent represents one 
of the key stakeholders (i.e. the managing director of the parent company with direct re-
sponsibility for the IJV). 
Another limitation of this study is the generalized definition of international strategic 
alliances employed and the limited scope (duration) of the alliances. Perhaps an alterna-
tive explanation for the failure to support hypothesis 3 (Learning potential) can be found 
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in the nature of collaboration included in this study. Parent firms may seek collaborative 
access to other firms' knowledge but will not necessarily wish to internalize the knowl-
edge in their own operations. For example, a firm primarily involved in distribution ac-
tivities may form an alliance with a manufacturer to ensure a stable product supply. 
Through the alliance, the distributor firm gains access to manufacturing skills. If the dis-
tributor has no acquisition intent associated with its partner's manufacturing skills, the 
manufacturing knowledge embodied in the alliance outputs has limited value to the dis-
tributor beyond the terms of the collaborative agreement. In addition, the effects of learn-
ing potential on alliance performance may simply be longer-term than captured in this 
study. Since respondents were asked to report on the most recent international strategic 
alliance in order to secure reliability of memory, all alliances had been formed within the 
last 5 years. Hence, controlling for type of alliance (horizontal or vertical), the nature of 
the agreement (motivation) and duration may prove beneficial for future research.  
Finally, a note on trust seems appropriate given its apparent importance for determin-
ing alliance performance. Trust is a multidimensional construct, including at least affec-
tion, cognition, and intended behavior (Cummings & Bromiley, 1996). In this study, in-
ter-organizational trust is based on items measuring affective and cognitive aspects of 
trust only. Moreover, since trust was not the central objective of the survey used for data 
collection, only a limited number of questions regarding this construct were included. In 
addition, measuring interorganizational trust via one respondent in the focal firms only 
presents obvious limitations in terms of reliability. A fruitful avenue for future research 
may be to cross-check measures of trust with other individuals within the focal firm as 
well as with individuals from the partner firm. Another promising future research direc-
tion is to investigate the mediating effects of trust, conceptualized at different stages of 
alliance development, on different alliance performance measures. When a new alliance 
is formed, there will often be a sense of hesitancy by the partners in terms of sharing 
knowledge, particularly if the partners have no prior collaborations. Over time, if an alli-
ance survives the critical honeymoon period, deeper ties between the partners becomes 
the norm. In many cases, ties develop between the managers involved in the alliance. 
Thus, after a relationship is formed and a pattern of interactions develops, partner firms 
may decrease their efforts to protect knowledge spillover. Specifically, as trust increases 
and mutual partner understanding develops, alliance knowledge becomes more accessible 
and the potential for innovation and learning increases. Hence, treating trust as both a fea-
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ture and a determinant of relationship quality in an attempt to examine the evolution of 
trust and its impact on international collaborative relationships seems a particular interest-
ing avenue for future research.  
Determining international strategic alliance performance is a complex process and 
remains a challenge to researchers and managers alike. This study has attempted to shed 
new light on the antecedents of international alliance performance while paying attention 
to the different stages of ISA development. Although this study employs a multidimen-
sional operationalization of alliance performance, more theorizing and empirical testing is 
needed in order to fully appreciate the complexity involved in ISA management. Perhaps 
then we will be able to determine not only why- but also whether IJVs succeed or fail. 
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